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ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS¹

1. The task of sociology is to study social life in all its manifold forms of manifestation. Ethical ideals and ethical endeavors, therefore, are objects of sociological research. They are working factors in social development, while they are themselves effects and symptoms of social conditions, results of social development.

They have their roots in the inner world of individuals ; but this inner world itself is not indifferent for sociology, which traces the interaction of individual and society in all its finest ramifications. The inner world does not develop itself independently of the outer. Social conditions determine directly or indirectly that which the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true. Very often the character and the direction of ethical life are determined by physiological or social heredity. And even the fact that individual initiative is at work sets no definite limit to sociological research, any more than biology gives up the right to investigate the organic variations which are the prerequisites of all natural selection.

From this point of view, sociology is a more comprehensive science than ethics, which is a more special and limited science. Sociology stands in a similar relation to ethics as does psychology. Ethical ideals and endeavors are not only sociological, but also psychological phenomena ; they are, therefore, objects for psychology as well as for sociology, and psychology is, in its turn, a more comprehensive science than ethics.

2. Sociology is not only more comprehensive than ethics, it is also a necessary foundation for ethics. The ethically right must be sociologically possible, must be consistent with the conditions and laws of social development. Ethics is not a system of castles in the air, but a doctrine of the means and ways for developing human life, individual and social, to greater richness and to greater harmony. Ethics ought then to be founded on a study of the nature and the conditions of the actual social development. Only with the help of this study can new values and old values be maintained.

¹ Synopsis of a paper read by HARALD HÖFFDING, professor of philosophy in the University of Copenhagen, before the Sociological Society, at a meeting in the School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), November 11, 1904 ; Mr. L. T. Hobhouse in the chair.

Since ethics is dependent on sociology, it follows that it cannot be the same at all times, but must vary as its historical foundation varies under different historical conditions. Ideals and motives, aims and means, must be different. The historical development may lead to ethical turning-points or to ethical dilemmas, even though it is following its own natural laws without any breach of continuity. There may be ethical discontinuity, though there is sociological continuity. I will give some examples.

Very often ethical development consists in this only, that what has been done involuntarily, or even unconsciously, under the influence of social heredity, is afterwards done with clear consciousness or as a result of deliberate choice. Aristotle says that involuntary working precedes voluntary and conscious working. It is, he says, by playing on the zither that we become good players, and it is by acting justly that we become just; in this way, the young are through education and tuition introduced to ways of acting and thinking which later on can be followed out with consciousness and free choice. When the time of involuntary imitation and exercise is over, it remains to be seen whether the same direction will be followed with full consciousness. But even if the young generation breaks off and adopts quite other ideals and endeavors, yet the first direction remains of great influence, both directly, as an element, and indirectly, through an effect of contrast. The sociological continuity is not broken, though new ideals and aims are acknowledged. The Aristotelian principle (so I name the law here spoken of) shows us a deeper connection, while from an ethical point of view there seem to be only disharmony and opposition.

But social development may also in a more positive way be the condition for ethical development. A thing which at first only had value as a means may later on acquire immediate value — value as an end in itself. Social conditions make certain actions necessary, which the individual would not undertake if they were not favorable to his own interests; for instance, he must respect the liberty of others, if he will have his own liberty respected. But later on he may adopt as his immediate end the liberty of all. There is here going on what I will call a subjective transformation of value. What is value at first only as a means has become value as an end. An objective transformation of value is going on when an end is so closely connected with the whole order of things that it cannot be isolated. The original end may then become a means to the acknowl-

edgment of greater and higher ends, and perhaps it may itself be swallowed up by them. The new ends may be connected with the original ends either by similarity or by a causal relation, or by mere propinquity.

This concatenation of means with ends and of ends with other ends is in great measure due to the social life and its institutions. By means of these the individual who wills something is drawn into a great process through which a whole series of transformations may arise. When such a transformation has taken place, ethical ideals and aims are not the same as before. New ethical formations have been produced through the continual social processes. It is the task of sociology to show us the conditions to which these transformations are due, and it is the task of ethics to give form to the new ideals and discover the direct paths. Ethics has to develop the consequences of the new standpoint. All ethics has so far an empirical character. Every step of evolution has its own ethics, and the ethics of one period cannot be deduced from that of the preceding one without knowledge of the whole intermediate social and psychological evolution.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. The ethically right must be psychologically possible, and there may be psychological continuity, though from an ethical point of view it must be admitted that a new movement has been initiated.

3. Though ethics is more specialized than sociology, and though it is in essential points dependent on sociology, yet it is an independent science. This independence manifests itself in the fact that social data, the results of historical development, are the objects for ethical valuation. In ethics these data and results are examined in their relation to an ideal, a standard; and their value depends on their harmonic or inharmonic relation to this ideal. The main difficulty of all ethics consists in the establishment of the ideal which is to give the standard of valuation. The great struggle between ethical systems concerns this establishment. Ethics has here problems which sociology, as such, as a purely descriptive and causal science, does not know. Sociology looks backward to discover the course and the laws of social evolution. Sociology comes after reality. A social process must be to a certain degree finished, before its law can be determined. We may say of sociology, what Hegel has said unjustly of philosophy in general, that the bird of Athene first begins

its flight in the twilight, when the labors and the struggles of the day are over. But in ethical thought the goddess herself appears on the field of battle. She does not forget what her bird has told her of the struggles and labors of former times, but she applies this knowledge in waging her war with the wisdom which becomes her divinity.

Historical data are the foundation on which ethical development is based. But in what manner and in what direction is this development, this conscious continuation of history, to proceed? That is the question. Here individual stands up against individual, individual against society, society against individual, and society against society. We have here all the four sorts of war which Grotius long ago distinguished. Ethical valuation must always be the work of individuals who start from certain definite social and mental presuppositions. How, then, can a universal ideal be formed, and how can a universal standard be set up? Here we have the real sting of the ethical problem. It is the greatest war in history, which here is carried on in the quiet world of thought. This war has also interest for the sociologist; but he is here only a spectator. The moral philosopher takes his place in the battle itself. The sociologist examines what is going on, and how it is going on; but the moral philosopher asks on which side the highest value is to be found, and how he can get a standard to test this value. The moral philosopher can as little set himself above sociological laws as the agriculturalist can set himself above chemical laws. But as the agriculturalist can make use of chemical laws in order to make the earth produce the profit he looks for, so the moral philosopher asks how we can make use of the sociological laws in order to produce ethically valuable results.

The independence of ethics manifests itself in the selection of ends and means within the manifold possibilities which sociology presents. The farther we advance on our way from sociology to ethics, the more the field of possibilities becomes narrowed. There are more possibilities in the marble block than the sculptor can actualize.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. Psychological possibilities present to ethics the same problem as was presented to it by the sociological possibilities. In both respects the great art is to find the differentiating principle.

4. Not only is there a difference between sociology and ethics, but there may be a sharp contrast between them, and it is important

to lay stress on this contrast—the contrast between valuation on the one side, and description and explanation on the other.

If we efface the distinction between the sociological and the ethical points of view, we are led either to regard the results of development as such as ideally right, or to suppose that the ideally right as such must have an existence. In the first place, sociology masters ethics; in the second, ethics masters sociology.

But this contrast can be acknowledged and maintained without forgetting how intimately sociology and ethics are connected. Sociology leads us on to ethics by the application of the comparative method. The comparison of social forms or social states naturally leads us to characterize some as higher, others as “lower.” This is a valuation; hence a certain standard is necessarily presupposed. We call a form of society higher than another, if it more than this other makes it possible to attain two ends at once, namely, the free and rich development of individual peculiarities and differences, and the realization of unity and totality in social life. From a sociological point of view, a society is the higher, the more different forms and directions it manifests, if at the same time the society as such increases in solidarity and concentration. In sociology, as in biology, the standard is this: the intimate connection of differentiation and concentration.

This has led to a comparison between society and an organism, and great scientific profit has been expected from this comparison.

This analogy is certainly of great importance; there is a similarity in the standard presupposed, when we call organisms higher or lower. And we may call societies higher and lower. Every science whose objects present both unity and multiplicity must in its comparisons make use of such a standard as sociology and biology exhibit. So is it, for instance, also with psychology. We call a personal life “high” if it exhibits at once a richness of endeavor, emotion, and ideas, and a firm and concentrated character; we call it “low” if it is poor and incoherent. The task of biology, psychology, and sociology is only description and explanation of facts. Comparison and comparative methods are here only methodological means. If comparison presupposes a standard, and if a standard can be constructed as an ideal, so that beings or species are called “higher” or “lower” according to their relation to an ideal end, this teleological manner of view is only a working hypothesis. We shall understand organic, psychical, and social life better, if we ask what a perfect form of life should presuppose.

But in ethics this manner of view has not merely methodological value. Here the standards and the ideals have also a positive and practical significance. The most intimate connection between unity and multiplicity in the life of the single individual and in the life of society is in ethics an end which ought to be reached, and it is the task of ethics to find means and ways which can make an approximation to this end possible. The highest aim of social ethics would be an empire of humanity in which there is the greatest possible multiplicity in the development of personal life and, even by this very means, the greatest intimate union of personal beings. If the single individual in developing himself in his own peculiar way gives the best possible contribution to the whole life of society, and if, on the other side, society is organized in such a manner that a free and full development is possible for all individuals, then we are approaching to the ethical ideal. Ethical imperatives are only logical and psychological consequences of the acknowledgment of this ideal.

The so-called social problem is also an ethical problem, and this gives it its own particular sting. A social problem arises when multiplicity—by progressing division of labor, for instance—prevails in such a degree that individuals are isolated and subjected to a one-sided and mechanical development, or when concentration prevails to such a degree that the free development of individuals is checked. There would not be any sting in this problem, if our ideal did not claim that every man shall be treated, not only as a means, or as a part of a machine, but also always as an end in himself. If this ethical principle is not presupposed, social factors may certainly be very interesting objects for science; but such science will be sociology, not ethics. There may be a great intellectual interest in watching how inharmonious states develop, and what effects they produce; but this interest is not an ethical interest, though it may be of great importance from an ethical point of view that there is such an interest.

5. I have already said that the difference between ethics and sociology cannot be said to consist in the fact that ethics has for its object the development of single individuals; sociology, that of society. There is nothing in the life of individuals which may not be of interest for sociology; and, on the other hand, ethics is not only individual, but also social. But it cannot be denied that the point of view of ethics causes it to accentuate, in a higher degree than sociology has occasion to do, that which is going on in the inner world of

individual consciousness. Even if a system of ethics maintains the social point of view, the point of view of society, or species, as the foundation on which it builds in valuing human acts and institutions, it cannot forget that society and species consist of individuals, and that the welfare of society or species is the welfare of these individuals. Only in the consciousness of individuals can the value of life be experienced. The concepts of society and of species do not, therefore, lose their importance in ethics. The importance of these concepts is similar to the importance of the conception of potential energy in physics. They can note conditions and possibilities for the unfolding of human life which are vaster and more comprehensive than the horizon of any individual—forms and germs of life by which many generations can profit. They contain the heredity of the past, organized results of the experiences of former generations—and at the same time dispositions and possibilities for the future. They are that which persists and continues, in opposition to the shifting interests of single individuals, groups, and generations. These potential values can be actualized only when they are appropriated and worked out by particular individuals.

Not all ethical theories give this point of view its full right. For Hegel the main point was what he called "the ethical substance," which works itself out in the different forms and stages of society, most typically in the state. In comparison with this social substance, the existence of the single individual is indifferent. The perfection of the individuals, for Hegel, is to live and breathe in the great whole of society; but for Hegel the essential in the ethical world is something which transcends the consciousness of any single individual. Though Wilhelm Wundt accentuates the importance of individual will more than Hegel, a similar view is found in his ethics. For Wundt "the total will," *die Gesammt-Wille*, which manifests itself in the existence of society is the mightiest of all facts. It is imperishable, and it is always right. The single individuals are perishable; with all their endeavor and all their capacity for happiness, they are only drops in the ocean!

Such theories overvalue potentiality at the expense of actuality. It is true that actuality always lives on potentiality, and that individuals live and work in virtue of social conditions. But that potentiality exists is known only from the fact that it can be transformed into actuality, and on this depends its value. The value of what Hegel calls "social substance," what Wundt calls "total will,"

consists in its power to support and nourish a rich personal life in great groups of individuals, and only through the study of what is going on in each group is the construction of this concept possible.

For Wundt and Hegel sociology and ethics are ultimately identical—a consequence of the absolute subordination of the individual point of view to the social. The same may be said of Auguste Comte in the first period of his philosophizing. In his *Cours de philosophie positive* he did not regard ethics as an independent science which has its special place in the series of the sciences; ethical ideas are here to be found partly in the biological, partly in the sociological, chapters of his work. But later in life Comte regarded ethics as an independent science, the seventh and last in the series of the fundamental sciences. The principle on which Comte arranged the sciences in a series was that the following science shall always be more concrete in its object and more inductive in its method than the preceding. When, then, in his later work he puts ethics after sociology, he presupposes that ethics is the more concrete and inductive science of the two. Now, Comte's reason for this view is that in sociology the individual motives and tendencies neutralize one another; it is the average results which are of sociological importance; while in ethics the character and the *tendency* of the inner life and the individual realities in their multiplicity have the first place.

I do not myself believe that Comte deduced all the consequences of the position which he finally assigned to ethics, nor that he gave a complete concept of the relation between the individual and the social points of view in ethics; but he points in the right direction. It is the strength, but it is also the weakness, of ethics that it is the most concrete of all sciences. It stands almost at the boundary between science and art. To conduct life ethically is the greatest of all arts. And, like all arts, it develops itself spontaneously. All that theory can do at first is to learn from this spontaneous development, to find its moving forces, and to formulate the thoughts which it presupposes.

Later on, the art can be exercised with greater consciousness, and there can then be an interaction between thought and life. And such an interaction cannot be established if ethics does not—the differences in point of view notwithstanding—remain in indebtedness both to sociology and to psychology.

DISCUSSION

MR. L. T. HOBHOUSE,² speaking from the chair: It may be said that the two points of view—the sociological and the ethical—are fundamentally opposed to one another; that sociology has to do with what is and has been, and that ethics has to do with what ought to be; and it does not require much experience of life to know that what ought to be is very seldom the same as what is. But while these things may be very distinct, nevertheless in the actual treatment of the social sciences there is a constant tendency to make that very confusion. I take, for instance, the sad history of economics, in which for seventy years past there has been a constant question as to how far ethical questions ought to be introduced. And we get constant protests from economists who say they are only telling us what are the consequences of certain events, the effects produced by certain conditions, but they are not wishing to express any moral judgment on these effects. But—such is human frailty—they have never been able to refrain from preaching tacitly, even if they were not preaching consciously. It is impossible to avoid, in the teaching of a social subject, the use of eulogistic or dislogistic terms. One might take a very simple instance from the ordinary usages of economists. You will recollect that early economists, in explaining the genesis of interest, refer it to the wages of abstinence which a person received as a reward for accumulating his capital. You will see at once that critics of that view pounced upon the conception of wages and abstinence, and said that you are in effect giving a moral justification for the nature of interest which, according to your own account, should be entirely absent from your mind. And, on the whole, I think criticism on that point may be justified. That illustrates how it is difficult to keep from ethical judgments in dealing with sociological questions. Surely, it is far better that we should be conscious of this difficulty and take questions of ethics into account—instead of doing it unconsciously—and apportion to them the share which we deliberately judge they ought to have.

There is a further point—that ethics ought legitimately to come into

² One of the most interesting figures in contemporary English philosophy, Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, promises to loom still larger in the future, for he is still below middle age. His book, *The Theory of Knowledge*, is notable as the first comprehensive attempt to sum up for English readers post-Kantian epistemological research and discussion, and is probably the most important English book of its kind since Mill's *Logic*. His *Mind in Evolution* is a study in comparative human and animal psychology, and may be considered as the psychological prolegomena to a large treatise on ethics handled on the comparative and evolutionary method, which he is about to publish. Mr. Hobhouse also illustrates a certain English tradition of combining speculative with practical life, for he alternates his philosophical with political activities. Formerly a Fellow and Tutor in an Oxford college, he has latterly taken some part in practical politics on the Liberal and anti-imperialistic side. He has published two books of political complexion, *Socialism and the Labor Movement* and, quite recently, *Democracy and Reaction*—the latter being an analysis of the reactionary forces and movements in social life, in politics, and in philosophy, during the past two generations, and more particularly during the past decade.

sociology (if we treat sociology as an investigation into human development) in the form of the supreme question: What is the tendency of that development? Are there a lower and a higher in it? Is evolution a process making for the betterment, perfection, and happiness of mankind, or a mere grinding out of the mechanical mill of existence, one no better than another, the outcome of blind forces, and destitute of any characteristics which can fill us with hope for the future of society? That question is always before us. In thinking what the standard of value is, we must know what we mean by "higher" and "lower," and so have a test by which we can differentiate the different stages of evolution. In that sense, then, I fully agree with the view in Professor Höffding's paper that ethics is necessary to sociology. I equally agree with the converse truth, that sociology is necessary to ethics; in other words, that you cannot, as a moral philosopher, philosophize in the air. You must know that the things you ought to do are the things you can do. It is no use telling people they ought all to be eight feet high. While you might preach that with great enthusiasm, no one could make himself one inch the higher. Again, if we could all run a mile a minute, we could dispense with motor cars. That is a sort of ideal, but it has no relation to ethics, because you cannot by any teaching cultivate yourselves to run a mile a minute. These things are obvious. We ought, therefore, I think, not only to have the ordinary experience of our own individual life to go upon when we think out questions of value, but we ought to have the whole wealth of that experience which sociology can lay before us. The richer the experience which the philosopher has before him, the more likely are his reflections to correspond to reality and give actual results.

I gather that Professor Höffding would agree with me that ethics, though closely related to sociology, is nevertheless independent of sociology. It is not to be regarded as a department of that science; but even in regard to the use of the term "science" in ethics, I think some cavil might be made. We might treat ethical questions on scientific grounds, but ethics I take to be of the nature of philosophy—an inquiry into ideals and what ought to be. Such an inquiry must have the richest possible experience as its basis. At the same time, it is different in this way, that the assumptions underlying it are the basis of all science. It is only when these assumptions are tested that we are able to test what is higher and lower.

DR. J. H. BRIDGES:³ It would seem, on the face of it, that the idea of regarding ethics separately from sociology would be like an attempt to write

³ Dr. J. H. Bridges is one of the founders of the *Positivist* movement in England, and during a long life has been one of its ablest and most thoughtful leaders and exponents. There is perhaps in England today no man of more encyclopædic learning. But Dr. Bridges' erudition differs from the dispersive scholarship of most encyclopædists in having been acquired as parts of an organized synthesis. It is, therefore, essentially culture and not mere learning—hence perhaps an explanation of his chief literary activities, which to a large extent have been devoted toward enlightening the public as to the real trend and significance of the

a treatise on algebra in which arithmetic should have no place. The two are inseparable. The simplest definition of ethics is: a consideration of the way in which the individual reacts upon his social surroundings. Every individual finds existing around him a social standard, which he may either fall short of; or with which he may accurately comply; or which, finally, he may surpass. In the first case, he is regarded as an average man, with neither blame nor praise; in the second, he incurs blame; and in the third, he will, ultimately, be regarded with praise. Ethics, therefore, presupposes a social organism by and through which the individual lives and grows; on which he acts, or may act, beneficially, adding something that was not there before. He has a certain margin of free action upon that society. This is true whatever type of social life we may choose to consider. Suppose a savage in the most primitive condition; or suppose, in the second place, an inhabitant of a mediæval town, with a city to defend, with a guild to stand by, and a church to which he owes obedience; or suppose, in the third place, a member of an ideal republic, such as we may picture to ourselves as existing in the future, living in the time when the world will have peace. In all these three cases the standard of ethics is widely different. In each there are definite rules of life; and in each there is a free margin of action, the domain of free human conduct, the domain of character. Ethics therefore presupposes sociology. Side by side with the judgment of conduct must go judgment of the social organism in which conduct takes place. There is a correspondence, though not always easy to disentangle, between the ethical system and the social system. The ethical system of primitive man corresponds in its larger features with the system of tribal organization. The ethical system of fully developed man, as we picture him to ourselves in the future, implies membership of a family, implies a community of families forming a nation, implies a community of nations holding peaceful intercourse under the supreme community of a progressive humanity. We best see the connection between ethics and sociology by taking imperfect types of sociology, and all types hitherto have been obviously imperfect. So long as humanity is divided against itself, we have two systems of contradictory ethics—ethics (to use Mr. Spencer's language) of enmity, and the ethics of amity. From the times of the Stoics and the early Christians—that is, for two thousand years—we have had these two standards of right and wrong before us. "Thou shalt hate thine enemy;" "Thou shalt love thine enemy"—these are the two codes: the Sermon on the Mount, and the code taught to all our schoolboys at public schools and advocated in most of our newspapers.

leading events of the day—a sort of higher journalism. His advocacy of justice—economic, political, and social—has been one of the progressive forces in English public life. It will be seen that Dr. Bridges combines in his personality something of the qualities both of Whewell and of Newman, as may be observed in his numerous contributions to that very remarkable production of the English Positivist group, *The New Calendar of Great Men*. He has edited an edition of Roger Bacon's works, which for the first time presents them in their proper totality.

This implies a fundamental imperfection in our sociology. Tolstoi accentuates the divergence of these two codes in the strongest possible manner by holding out as the highest ethical virtue the duty of absolutely refusing to fight for your country. In any case, this divergence of the two standards indicates radical imperfections in our social system, the gradual removal of which would appear to be the principal constituent of progress, in any true sense of the word. One of the most pressing problems of ethics would seem to be the concentration of such action of the individual on the society to which he belongs as shall tend to this result. In other words, our large department of ethics would seem to consist in efforts to bring about the peaceful intercourse of nations by steadfast resistance to what is commonly known as imperialism.

Coming to the concluding part of Professor Höffding's discourse, I wish to express my concurrence in his view that ethics lies on the borderland between art and science. Each step of ethical progress is a reaction of the individual on the social environment around him. It implies a free, spontaneous action. It implies something creative, something inspired; as when the Hebrew prophets in the eighth century before Christ rose above the narrow ritual of their tribal god to a vision of justice and pity. Ethical inspiration, as I conceive it, must always be guided by the laws of sociology; must be in accordance with them; but must always transcend them, just as the genius of the musical composer transcends the laws of counterpoint, while recognizing their validity.

We come here to the region of thought which sociology and ethics occupy in common: the study of the formation of character; the inquiry how social institutions act on the individual; the whole department of inherited attributes known to us as "eugenics;" the whole business of the education of the man or woman from birth, or from before birth, till old age. This is at once the highest branch of sociology, and may be taken as a point of departure for ethics. At any rate, it is matter for scientific treatment. When we come to the reaction of the individual on society, we find ourselves in a different region. Science is not dumb here; but it has less to say to us than imagination inspired by love. To follow with due humility in the track of Dante's pilgrimage, we might say that Virgil recedes into the background and Beatrice becomes the guide. Ethics cannot dispense with science; it will need it more and more. But, in its highest sense, the conduct of life is not a science, but an art. It is not a problem, but a poem.

DR. WESTERMARCK: ⁴ If I have anything to add for my own part to Professor Höffding's paper, the reason is that the terms "sociology" and "ethics"

⁴ Dr. E. Westermarck, author of *The History of Human Marriage*, needs no introduction to American students of sociology; but they may be interested to know that he now holds an appointment in the University of London — the first lectureship in sociology established in a British university. Coincidentally with the formation of the Sociological Society in London in 1903, one of its founders, Mr. Martin White, provided funds for sociological teaching in the University of London, and in this connection Dr. Westermarck was last year invited to a

allow of different interpretations. Some writers apply the word "sociology" to the widest generalizations of social phenomena; whereas, according to others, the scientific treatment of any social phenomenon falls within the scope of sociology. To this latter opinion I thoroughly subscribe. I define sociology as the science of social phenomena; and by a social phenomenon I understand a mode of conduct which is related to an association of individuals—either joint acts of associates, or conduct toward an associate or associates. What, then, is ethics? I believe that ethics, as a science, can only be the study of the moral consciousness as a fact. Normative ethics, which lays down rules for conduct, is not a science. The aim of every science is to discover some truth, and an ethical norm can be neither true nor false. It has been said that moral principles cannot be proved because they are first principles, used to demonstrate everything else; but I believe that the real cause for the impossibility of proving moral principles is that all ethical concepts are ultimately based on emotions, of either approval or disapproval. The concepts of wrongness, rightness, duty, justice, goodness, virtue, merit, and so forth, refer to generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth a moral emotion. It may be true or not that a given mode of conduct has a tendency to evoke in us a certain emotion, but the contents of an emotion fall entirely outside the category of truth. Now, moral feelings and ideas express themselves through the medium of conduct which has reference to associates; in other words, the modes of conduct which form the subject-matter of sociology are to a large extent expressions of feelings and ideas which form the subject-matter of scientific ethics. The science of ethics is therefore practically a part of sociology. It deals with the feelings and ideas underlying certain modes of conduct, while sociology deals with the modes of conduct which spring from those feelings and ideas. The relation between sociology and normative ethics is, of course, a very different one. As normative ethics is no science at all, it cannot form part of sociology, which is a science. However, in laying down its rules for conduct, normative ethics must consider the results at which sociology has arrived; but this point has already been so admirably treated by Professor Höffding that I have nothing to add. Another question is how far normative ethics should exercise an influence on sociology. I think that this influence ought to be as small as possible. The sociologist must never forget that his business is, not to pass moral judgments on social facts, but to study those facts as they are.

PROFESSOR HÖFFDING, in replying: It is a very difficult question, that of the relation between sociology and ethics. It is many-sided. It is not quite easy to find a rather short expression to characterize it.

lectureship in "The Comparative Study of Social Institutions." Dr. Westermarck has almost ready for publication a work on comparative ethics, for which he has been preparing and accumulating material for more than half a generation. His preliminary research includes several years' travel and investigation among the Arab tribes of Morocco.

Among the remarks put forth here, there is one which I regard as a most important one. It is the question of ethics as a science. It came from the chairman in this form: "Is ethics philosophy or science?" It was emphasized in Dr. Westermarck's remarks. He would conceive ethics only as a department of sociology. I have not in my paper given my whole conception of ethical principles, or a scientific foundation for them. We have no one ethical system to which we can refer and say: "This is true ethics," or, "Those acts are not ethical." We have no science of ethics in the same sense as we have a science of mathematics or physics. There are still discussions going on as to how we come to the first principles in ethics. Dr. Westermarck said that all science is about facts, about something which exists and which we try to describe and explain; but I cannot see that there should be anything unscientific in an essay to develop the sequences of certain ideals, or aims, or motives, when these ideals, or aims, or motives are psychological and historical realities. That there are different ideals and aims at work is a difficulty, not only for my view, but also for Dr. Westermarck's. I should think that Dr. Westermarck would find himself in some difficulty if he says: "This is a moral consciousness." There are many moral consciousnesses at different and at the same time. In our own time there are very different and opposing moral consciousnesses. We have an example in the differences between Tolstoi and his antagonists. Can a sociologist take one single form, one special determined form, and say that this is the true moral consciousness? Here the problem comes again. It is not to be put aside, and on this point there will always be a certain independence for ethics.

One of the speakers raised a question about teleology, which, so far as I understood it, was this: How can we say that the teleological point of view has another importance in ethics than in sociology? I touched on the point in my paper, because it is a way of casting light on the relation between sociology and ethics. Sociology is a science which only describes and explains facts. It ought, therefore, to follow the same methods as natural science, and sociology, as such, cannot know anything about aims, and ends, and ideals. If a sociologist makes use of an end, or an aim, he does so only methodologically. If the biologist supposes that there are certain aims which an organism shall serve, that is a method for scientific study; but biology cannot tell us why organisms are in the world. In ethics we begin with aims and ends as psychological realities. There are aims after which we are striving; and if in their pursuit we attain a certain knowledge of means and ways, we cannot, without contradicting ourselves, abstain from following the rules of action in doing, thinking, and feeling, which are consequences of this knowledge. Socrates, the founder of ethics, applied this method.